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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper concludes that we have auditors who, in general, do not understand derivatives but who 
are stipulating to the accuracy of the financial reports of companies that make extensive use of 
derivatives. We have financial analysts, many of which do not have an in depth understanding of 
derivatives, or accounting standards that govern them or their effect on company valuation. Even if 
the security analysts are knowledgeable about Derivatives it is doubtful that they have enough, or 
the correct, information to do a thorough analysis. We have many government regulators, most of 
whom even in the securities industry, generally have little or no knowledge relating to derivatives. 
And we have the general public, many of whom invest in the securities of these companies, but are 
not able to assess the effect of derivatives usage on their prospective investments. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
t is a major premise of this paper that most accountants, financial, or security, analysts, bankers and 
certainly stock brokers do not have a thorough knowledge of Derivatives and the effect of their use on the 
value of corporate securities. Because there are standards for reporting the use of derivatives that have 
been developed and promulgated by the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), notably SAS92 and FASB 
statements 133, 138, and 149, it is therefore necessary to have an in depth understanding of the accounting treatment, 
including assumptions used in valuing derivative contracts. In addition you must have a detailed knowledge of a 
multitude of derivative instruments and the related theory and speculation, or hedging, relationships to understand and 
interpret even the existing accounting guidelines and related disclosure information. This is a problem because most 
financial institution executives and other evaluators or analysts have little or no formal, or informal, education in these 
instruments. The results of this deficiency can be easily demonstrated by referring to numerous examples like the  
"unauthorized" derivatives trading which brought down the very large and prestigious Barings Bank (1994, $1.4 
Billion) in England a few years ago, The Orange County debacle, Proctor and Gamble's experience with Banker's 
Trust, Long Term Capital Management (1998, $3.5 Billion)  which had to be bailed out by the Federal Reserve, and 
the more recent problems, all during 2004, at National Australia Bank, Citigroup, China Aviation and also at Fannie 
Mae documented in (Barron's, 2004). Each of those derivatives experiences resulted in losses of hundreds of millions 
or billions of dollars. In the Barings case Nicolas Leeson's derivatives trading cost Baring's over a billion dollars and 
caused the bank's demise. Later, in October 2005 Refco, one of the world's largest derivatives brokers was forced to 
suspend trading. In January 2006, a London based derivatives trader was suspended and subsequently dismissed at 
Deutsche Bank for allegedly overstating trading profits by 30 million British pounds. These are only a few historical 
examples of derivatives related losses. For a derivatives trader's perspective of the significant  risk involved in trading 
derivatives see Partnoy, 2003. 
 
Therefore, to evaluate, or value, corporate securities in terms of their equities (stocks), their debt instruments 
(bonds), or short term lending prospects the security analyst or bank officer is at a disadvantage and the possible 
related consequences are significant.  This paper proposes some solutions for this problem in terms of education, 
consultants with expertise, and other possibilities. Part of the problem is a lack of knowledge about the basics of 
Derivatives. Another part of the problem is that there is such a broad array of specialized derivatives and the 
complexity of valuing and evaluating the multiplicity of derivative instruments in existence and use that even people 
with expertise in this area may be potentially misled. Further, there is the consideration of derivative usage in a 
portfolio context and the possibility of default by one of the parties to the contract.  This paper will organize 
I 
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derivatives in a limited number of categories with common attributes for ease of analysis, describe the accounting 
guidelines for derivatives in financial statements, and suggest how to interpret financial information relating to the use 
of derivative instruments. Without widespread education and knowledge about derivatives potentially disastrous 
consequences related to misuse and misunderstanding of derivatives is inevitable. 
 
Let’s begin with some basic Definitions: 
 
 A derivative is generally a leveraged financial instrument that "derives" its value and its changes in value 
from the value and changes in value of an underlying asset. The most common types of derivatives are 
options, futures, and swaps. There are, of course, many other kinds of derivatives but this paper will utilize 
examples for these basic three.  
 A Speculation in derivatives implies a single position that projects that the value of the derivative in the 
future will go up (a long position), or down (a short position).  
 A Hedge in its most simple form implies two opposite, or somewhat offsetting, positions with one typically 
short position and one long position.  
 Derivatives under FAS 133 are assets or liabilities and therefore must be accounted for in the balance sheet. 
Likewise profits or losses on derivatives are recognized in current income or shareholder's equity.  
 
TYPES OF HEDGES UNDER FAS 133 
 
There are three different types of hedges, with different accounting treatment, recognized under 133. First, 
there is a fair value hedge. Second, there is a cash flow hedge. Third, there is a foreign currency hedge. Related to that 
in 133 is the requirement to provide information on hedge effectiveness. That is, the company must provide 
documentation that explains the relationship between the hedges utilized and the firm's risk management objectives. 
For a detailed discussion of the development of FAS 133 the three types of hedges and their implementation see 
(Anson, 1997).  
 
The major objectives of this paper include (1) describing, organizing and evaluating the most common types 
of Derivative instruments currently used by corporations and the extent to which they are used, (2) Explaining the 
impact of existing accounting standards as they apply to financial reporting of Derivative usage,  (3) Analyzing the 
problems of valuing companies that have substantial Derivative positions,  (4) Making suggestions for evaluating the 
usage and impact of Derivatives as it relates to security analysis.  
 
Methodology 
 
This study collects data on the use of derivatives and the related disclosure information required by 
accounting standards in the financial statements for a small sample of major U.S. corporations. The information is 
then utilized to indicate how to organize and evaluate the disclosures. There was a small pilot study completed about a 
year ago utilizing data from 2003 annual and related 10-K reports for 8 publicly traded companies. (Christner, 2004). 
This study updates the earlier one adding data from 2005 annual and 10-K reports from 13 additional publicly traded 
companies to evaluate whether the reporting of Derivatives usage has changed. For instance, it was noted that there 
was little detail provided by the companies in the earlier study about their derivative positions or hedging strategies, 
philosophy or objectives for a majority of the 2003 sample. Also, this study will attempt to provide meaningful 
categories to distinguish the level and usefulness of the company's derivative disclosure information. The results 
expected relate to providing a methodology for financial executives and investors with limited knowledge of 
Derivatives to interpret and evaluate the potential impact of derivatives usage on the value of a corporation and its 
debt and equity securities.  
 
RATIONALE OF THIS STUDY 
 
We could ask whether the analysis of derivatives usage and understanding of these admittedly complex 
financial instruments is important. Allow me to cite some reasons other than the above examples of companies that 
suffered substantial losses.  First, there is a tremendous body of literature on this and related topics some of which will 
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be enumerated below. Secondly, FASB has not only promulgated at least four major sets of accounting standards over 
the past few years but they have also created the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG), which has already 
provided guidance on FASB 133 on more than 200 related issues. Thirdly, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), in their Accounting Standard 39, although less restrictive than U.S. standards, deals with similar 
Derivative related issues. However, all European companies, for the first time, are supposed to follow similar 
accounting rules mandated under the IASB standards.(Norris(Herald Tribune), 2004), (4) Included in CFA Exam 
topics are swaps, hedging, and Derivatives strategy (5) Multiple pronouncements by the Federal Reserve Board and 
other regulators(Whalen,2004) related to Derivatives and their usage and effects.(6) However, the bottom line reason 
is that the widespread use of derivatives by a large number of companies effects the risk, return and valuation 
characteristics of those companies in a material way.  
 
RECENT LITERATURE  
 
There have been many recent articles relating to the corporate use and financial reporting of Derivative usage 
for hedging in the U.S. (Pollock, 2004), and Europe (Norris, 2004). The Pollock article documents the effects of FAS 
133 on Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac and points out some of the weaknesses associated with applying the current 
accounting standards for reporting the utilization of Derivative contracts. Specifically the article suggests that 
investors in these debt and equity securities may be more baffled than informed in regard to the application and 
information garnered from the application of FAS 133. The Norris article suggests that the IASB, the European 
equivalent of FASB is in the U.S., significantly "watered down" the income statement related volatility effects of their 
Derivatives accounting standard (39). The Whalen article partially titled "How the Feds are seeking to make the world 
safe for Derivatives" (Whalen, 2004), posits that small banks that are encouraged to use derivatives, but do not have 
the necessary expertise to understand them, can cause major disruptions in the U.S. financial system. A general theme 
of recent articles is the criticism of the effects of FAS 133 on earnings volatility, equity valuation, and the problem of 
valuing only one side of a two-sided hedging position. Both the Pollock article and (Bodurtha & Thornton, 2002) 
suggest alternate methods of presenting the information currently furnished and methods currently utilized under the 
current derivative accounting standards (133, etc.) in order to show a more accurate financial picture. From a security 
analysts perspective (Will, 2002) says that analysts and rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch) have 
said that they focus on operating income which is adjusted to exclude the impact of FAS 133, instead of the net 
income figure which can be significantly modified by 133. Further, he states that the rating agencies also focus on 
common equity and qualifying preferred stock values instead of analysis of comprehensive income which  can be 
significantly impacted by FAS 133 but that they (the rating agencies) do also evaluate a company's ability to manage, 
understand and properly value their derivatives positions. However,  (Will, 2002) concludes that FAS 133 is useful in 
that it requires the company to state their objectives for the use of each derivative, and to disclose the quality, type, 
and effectiveness of their hedges. These three papers all suggest that the application of FAS 133 obscures the true 
economic situation and that a separate set of figures excluding the effects of FAS 133 would be very helpful. Indeed, 
(Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004) study found that firms with higher quality disclosures have higher market/book value 
ratios, thus enhancing shareholder value and/or thereby lowering the risk related cost of capital. A good discussion of 
the analysts viewpoint of Accounting for Derivatives is found in (Kawaller, 2004). He suggests that for an analyst to 
evaluate a company and its derivatives positions they need to know what price exposure exists, how much of it is 
hedged with derivatives and how much is not, and how hedged positions are managed. FAS 133 only provides 
information on the portion of the perceived risk exposure is hedged and therefore may not provide information on 
what may be a very large risk that may not be hedged. Further, Kawaller suggests that how well a company's risk 
managers anticipate price changes and adjust hedge coverage may be much more critical to a company's securities 
valuations than the profit and loss results from static hedge positions. (Kawaller, 2000) also discusses the differential 
impact of FAS 133 on Futures vs. Forward positions. For example he points out that gains and losses on futures 
contracts are realized under 133 immediately after they occur but losses on forward contracts, a potential alternative 
hedging instrument, are not realized until the end of the contract. Thus the choice of a future or forward under FAS 
133 could have vastly different financial, timing based, implications. However, this problem was recognized, but not 
necessarily correctly solved (see Kawaller, 2002) by amending FAS 133 with FAS 138 which excluded forward 
contracts under the redefined "normal purchases and sales" exception to being defined as a derivative under 133. As 
(Kawaller, 2002) points out, excluding forward contracts from 133 requirements may cloud the true financial picture 
analysts interpret. A related problem to understanding the implications of FAS 133 is the likely widespread lack of 
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knowledge regarding derivatives in the accounting profession. As (Baskett, 2004) documents, accountants who 
provide audited financial statement verification are generally not trained to understand derivatives. Therefore, when 
an auditor and their firm attest to the accuracy of what is contained in a firm's financial statements, especially if the 
firm utilizes derivatives for hedging purposes, there are significant risks involved for the accounting firm and the end 
users such as financial analysts. This is because most accountants, including auditors, are not experts in the very 
complex area of derivatives. Therefore, they must either develop the competency or rely on an outside expert. In either 
case the auditor is at a disadvantage and therefore so is the securities analyst when relying upon the FAS 133 
generated information.  
 
A SAMPLE OF DERIVATIVES REPORTING FOR EIGHT FIRMS  
 
The original study examined recent annual financial reports of eight companies to evaluate how they 
implemented FAS 133 in their financial reporting. The eight companies were randomly chosen and 
represent varying industries and company sizes that utilize derivatives to various extents. They are Intel, American 
Express, Merck, Harsco, Delta Airlines, Corning, Annheuser Busch and Tootsie Roll. The original study utilized the 
companies 2003 Financial statements. It is informative to review how some typical companies report Derivatives 
positions in their financial statements to see how much uniformity of information is provided. If the information 
provided under 133 and later amendments is not comparable then analysis by comparison, and thereby analyzing 
similar companies, will be difficult.  
 
REPORTING STANDARDS AND METHODS UNDER FASB 133  
 
The standard statement of accounting treatment and definitions of FASB 133 and related standards found in 
all of the companies financial statements is shown in Table 1 (Below). 
 
 
Table1:  Variance in Financial Statement Disclosures for Derivatives (2003) * 
Company Annual 
Reports or 10K 
Types of Derivatives 
Utilized 
Disclosure Standards 
Cited (FAS) 
Tables or Other 
Specifics 
Risks Hedged 
1.  Intel (p.57-59) Currency forward 
contracts currency 
options, currency in 
trade swaps 
≤  24 months –some 
≤  12 Months-some 
≥ years-some 
133 to 149 Detailed derivative 
information table 
Currency, interest 
rates, some equity 
market 
2.  American Express 
(p. 93-95) 
Interest rate swaps 
variable in future cash 
flows ≤  15 years 
foreign currency 
forwards ≤  36 months 
Not mentioned None, except swaps 
balance, and limited 
maturity data besides 
“various” under debt, 
not derivatives, section 
Interest rates, FX 
3.  Corning (p.84-85; 
58-59) 
Forwards, FX option 
and interest rate swaps 
for currency debt issue 
133, 137, 138, 149 January Fair values-
total 
FX contracts-forward 
FX contracts-options 
Interest rate, FX 
4.  Delta Airlines (p. 
F-14) 
Fuel (heating and 
crude oil) contracts, 
interest rate swaps, 
equity warrants, FX 
options and forwards 
options and forwards  
≤  36 months 
133 to 149 Summary, good 
impact table on 
financial statement 
state of operations, 
specifics given on 
interest rates on 
amount and time 
Fuel, interest rates, 
equities 
5.  Tootsie Roll Futures contracts-raw 
material primarily 
sugar 
149 No amount and value 
not specified –not 
expected to be 
materials 
Sugar 
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6.  Merck (pp. 37-39) 1. Local Currency put 
options 
2.  Forward contracts 
in country currencies 
3.  Interest rate and 
currency swap 
contracts 
133 A specific, single large 
transaction is 
discussed in specific 
terms, amount, time, 
type table included 
showing all three in 
amounts 
Currency, FX, interest 
rate 
7.  Harsco (pp. 78-80; 
56) 
FX forwards ≤  6 
months 
133 to 149 3-amount and maturity 
and type and fair 
values 2002-2003 
specified in detail table 
 
8.  Annheuser-Busch Futures - commodities 133 Detailed table showing 
positions and amount, 
fair, value, gains and 
losses for three years 
2001-2003 
Interest rate, FX, 
commodity 
* Annual Report or 10-K, FAS – Financial Accounting Standards, FX – Foreign exchange = currency. 
 
 
This section of the paper will summarize the differences in reporting for these companies.  It will be 
organized by the type(s) of derivatives used, how they are used, and what information is reported.   
 
Intel 
 
Intel utilizes currency forward contracts, currency options, and currency swaps in three time period 
categories less than 24 months, less than 12 months and less than 5 years.  They reference being in compliance with 
FASB 133 and 149. There is no detailed information, such as a table, showing the positions, term of the positions or 
their cash or fair values.  
 
American Express 
 
American Express utilizes interest rate swaps to hedge variation in future cash flows for period of up to 15 
years. They also use foreign currency forward contracts for periods up to 36 months. They say they have adopted 
FASB 133 and 149. There is no detailed discussion, or table showing the actual derivative positions by type, amount, 
term, or values. They do have limited information on swap balances and swap maturity, which is generally described 
as "various", under the debt but not the derivative disclosure information section.  
 
Corning 
 
Corning utilizes Forward contracts (henceforth called Forwards) and options to hedge Foreign Exchange 
(FX) risk, interest rate swaps, and foreign currency debt issues as hedging vehicles. They reference adopting FASB 
standards 133, 137, 138, and 149. They break down their hedges in summary form by category, type, such as option or 
forward contract, and also provide summary type information on their fair value.  
 
Delta  
 
Delta utilizes and hedges future Jet Fuel price risk using the proxies of heating and crude oil forwards and 
options. They also utilize equity warrants, interest rate swaps, and FX options and forwards with terms up to 36 
months. Delta references their adoption of FASB 133 and 149. They have summary tables that specify amounts and 
terms and gain and loss information on their fuel hedge and equity options for 2001, 2002, and 2003. They also 
describe their interest rate swaps in terms of amounts, maturities, yields, and fair values.  
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Merck  
 
Merck utilizes local currency put options, forward currency contracts, and interest rate and currency swap 
contracts.  Merck references their adoption of FASB 133. Merck shows a table indicating the amount and fair value 
for their currency options, FX forwards, currency swaps and interest rate swaps for 2002 and 2003. Maturities of 
derivative positions were not generally indicated except for a large ($500 million), 10 year, interest rate swap position 
initiated in 2003, and a 7 year currency swap position expiring in 2004.  
 
Harsco  
 
Harsco utilizes FX Forwards for up to 6 months. They reference their adoption of FASB 133 and 149. They 
indicate and specify their derivatives positions in terms of type, amount, maturity, fair value and recognized gains or 
losses for years 2002 and 2003.  
 
Annheuser Busch  
 
Annheuser utilizes Commodity futures price hedges, interest rate and FX hedges all with maturities of a 
maximum of 5 years. They reference their adoption of FASB 133. They have a detailed table showing gains and losses 
on their positions as well as a table showing a breakdown of the type of positions, and their fair values for the three 
years 2001-2003. There is however, no maturity breakdown.  
 
Tootsie Roll  
 
Tootsie Roll utilizes Futures contracts to hedge raw materials prices, primarily sugar. They cite their adoption 
of FASB 149. There is no detailed breakdown on their positions by amount, value, or maturity. They state that they 
believe that there will be no material effect from their hedging activities.   
 
A 9th company, Rohm-Haas, is used for a very limited comparison. 
 
Rohm-Haas  
 
Because the 2001 financial statements from Rohm Haas were available and they were reviewed solely to 
compare or contrast any differences in reporting of accounting standards shortly after FASB 133 first went into effect.  
 
Rohm-Haas state in their 2001 financial report that they have adopted SFAS 133 amended by 137 and 138 
and DIG issue G-20, Assessing and Measuring the Effectiveness of a Purchased Option used in a Cash Flow Hedge. It 
is interesting that this was the only company where it was observed that the DIG issue reports were mentioned.  
 
As is evident from the above discussion of the financial reporting of derivative positions by these varied 
types of companies, there is little uniformity, or comparability, in these reports. In other words there is not sufficient 
information to make comparative valuation decisions or projections across companies even within the same industry 
or sector classification. They vary by type of derivative instrument, by type of asset hedged and the type and level of 
detail provided in what is hedged, when and for how long. Specifically, there was no uniformity of information on 
how long the hedges typically, or actually, last, how much of the total asset position is unhedged, the specific amounts 
that are hedged, and how the decision is made to initiate or terminate the hedge. Further, no comparison of what the 
financial results would have been without the impact of FASB 133 and related reporting standards is given.  Under 
these circumstances and the fact that the standards have been and will continue to be revised (for example the 
numerous DIG's issued and modifications to 133 like 149) it is obvious that comparing, or evaluating results even for 
a single company over time will yield analytical results that are likely to be of questionable value.  
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THE 2005 SAMPLE 
 
There were three duplicated companies studied in both 2003 and 2005. They are Intel, Harsco, and Rohm-
Haas. 
 
Intel 
 
Again it hedged currency and interest rate risk currency forward contracts, currency options, and interest rate 
swaps. They provided a two-year comparison of year-end values, but if anything there was less detailed information 
on derivatives usage in the 2005 data than in the 2003 reports. 
 
Harsco 
 
Similar to 2003 report. 
 
Rohm-Haas 
 
More detailed information in 2005 than in 2003 on notational and fair values and net gains and losses for 
three years. 
 
Table 2, below, summarizes the Derivatives information provided for the other ten companies in the new 
2005 report sample. Again, or still, there is little information that is comparable among the firms.  
 
 
Table 2:  Variance In Financial Statement Disclosures For Derivatives (2005) * 
Company Annual 
Reports or 10K  
Types of Derivatives 
Utilized 
Disclosure Standards 
(FAS) 
Tables or Other 
Specifics 
Risks Hedged 
1.  Walmart (p.38) Swaps Not mentioned (NM) 2004-2005 - Two-year 
comparison of amounts 
when initiated, 
notational and fair 
value.  Change in fair 
value past three years 
2003-2005 
Interest rates, FX rates 
2.  Hilton  (p. 49) Call options NM Derivative assets and 
liability carrying 
amount and fair value 
two years 2004-2005 
Cash flow hedge of a 
foreign currency and     
oil – 2.5 mill barrels 
3.  General Motors 
(p.132, 133) 
Uses forward 
contracts, swaps, and 
options up to three 
years in the future 
NM No table, but specifies 
gains and losses for 
2004-2005 
FX, interest rates, 
certain commodity 
prices 
4.  Loews (LTR) (p. 
153-157) 
Options, swaps, futures 
and collars (also uses 
short sales for portfolio 
management strategy) 
NM Carrying amounts and 
fair values 2004, 2005 
and detailed 
explanations of 
hedging philosophy 
and tables, 2003-2005 
of national and fair 
value and gains/losses 
Extensive discussion 
and detail on extensive 
use of derivatives  
Interest rate, credit, FX 
and equity stock price, 
group annuity 
contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Lance (p. 37, 43) Interest rate swap 
 
133, 149 No table, but amount, 
interest rate and 
expiration noted 
Interest rate 
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6.  J.P. Morgan Chase 
(pp. 94, 123) 
Interest rate swaps 
Futures and forwards 
133, 138, 149 Fair value and cash 
flow gains and losses 
2004, 2005 
Interest rate risk, FX 
risk also uses 
derivatives for trading 
not hedging purposes 
in interest rate, FX, 
credit, equity, 
commodity 
7.  Rohm-Haas (p. 75) Options and forwards, 
collars, swaps 
133 Net gains/losses 
specified for 2005 
notational value noted 
net gain or loss for 
2003-2005 specified 
Fair value specified for 
2004, 2005 
FX, raw material 
(commodity), interest 
rate 
 
8.  Harsco (p.91) Forwards 133 Table specifying 
maturity, amount and 
gain/losses, maturity, 
through December 31, 
2004 and December 
31, 2005  
FX 
9.  Intel  (p. 55) Interest rate swaps, 
forward contracts, 
currency options 
NM Only derivative total 
value (asset and 
liability) as of year end 
2004, 2005 
Currency, interest rate, 
FX and equity 
exposure 
10.  Ford Motor (p.84, 
85, 86) 
Forwards and options 
interest rate and 
currency swaps, 
maturity generally 3-5 
years  
 
NM Overall year end gain 
or loss and fair and 
notational value for 
2003, 2004, 2005 in 
cash flow, fair value 
and net investment 
hedges specified 
FX, commodity 
11.  Washington 
Mutual  (pp. 103, 123, 
154-157) 
Swaps, options, futures 
and forwards 
133 Summary of gains or 
losses from overall 
derivatives 2003-2005.  
(p. 123) detailed 
discussion of use of 
derivatives  
Interest rate, credit 
12.  Southwest Airlines  
(C-42, C-43, C-44) 
 
Options, collars, swaps 133 Percentage hedged for 
2006 and 2007  
Overall gains and 
losses for 2003-2005 
specified 
Jet fuel (oil based), 
interest rate 
13.  Exxon-Mobil  (A-
38) 
Not specified, 
derivatives did not 
have material effect 
 Limited use of 
derivatives, net overall 
gain/losses specified 
2003-2005 
Gas sales and purchase 
contracts 
*   Annual Report or 10-K, FAS - Financial Accounting Standards, FX - Foreign exchange = currency. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
So, to summarize, we have auditors who, in general, do not understand derivatives but who are stipulating to 
the accuracy of the financial reports of companies that make extensive use of derivatives. We have financial analysts, 
many of which do not have an in depth understanding of derivatives, or accounting standards that govern them or their 
effect on company valuation. Even if the security analysts are knowledgeable about Derivatives it is doubtful that they 
have enough, or the correct, information to do a thorough analysis. We have many government regulators, most of 
whom even in the securities industry, generally have little or no knowledge relating to derivatives. And we have the 
general public, many of whom invest in the securities of these companies, but are not able to assess the effect of 
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derivatives usage on their prospective investments. Can we quickly educate all or many of these groups? Obviously 
not! One solution for the general investing public and even for professional investors who do not understand 
derivatives well is simply to avoid the companies involved with them. However, derivative, investment, and portfolio 
theory tell us that derivatives when properly utilized can reduce the risk for a company and its securities relative to 
expected return. Because many companies have substantial risk exposure to large variation in things like interest rates, 
currencies and commodity prices, hedging against those risk factors is a prudent thing to do. A good example is 
Southwest airlines hedges against rising jet fuel prices that allowed them to remain profitable when most other major 
carriers were reporting losses. So avoiding the risk is not a very good solution for the company or individual investor. 
Next is the solution of understanding the risk. One way already suggested is to provide more information and more 
understandable, and comparable, information. Detailed comparable information should be provided about the type, 
size, maturity, current value, fair value and accrued gains and losses on derivative positions for at least the current 
year as compared to the previous two years. Also, financial results that provide information of results with, and what 
they would have been without, hedging and the provision of information on the size of unhedged portion of the risk 
vs. the hedged portion over time should be mandatory.  Defining hedging rationales and any changes in hedging 
philosophy in regard to size and timing of positions over time should also be included. In this way even security 
market evaluators and participants could at least understand the philosophy and objectives underlying the hedging 
even if they did not have an in depth knowledge of the hedges and derivative instruments and their relationships. Also, 
anything that provides detailed information on the various hedge positions held currently and historically and in 
comparison to the entire company in a portfolio risk/return framework along with a verbal explanation would be 
useful. 
 
To clarify, it can be misleading to look at derivative based hedging as static. A corporate hedging philosophy 
develops and changes over time. If that dynamic is not understood because you only see a one quarter or even one 
year set of standard financial statements and disclosures without further clarification of the hedging dynamics and 
philosophy, then you are examining a very small, and inadequate, piece of a much larger picture.  
 
Further, mandatory, and specific, initial and continuing education requirements at a minimum for auditors, 
security analysts and CFA candidates in the areas of Derivatives, hedging concepts and related topics is also 
suggested. For example, the New York Institute of Finance offers a course in "Accounting for Derivatives" which 
covers the necessary topics. Mandatory utilization of recognized experts on derivatives as consultants to auditors and 
security analysts, with insufficient derivatives backgrounds, is also a suggested possibility. Under the risk 
management precepts of ways to manage risk which include avoid, minimize, shift, or absorb potential risk, derivative 
related education minimizes or at least lessens the risk of error. As (Baskett, 2004) suggests there is the risk taken by 
the firm in conjunction with their derivatives positions and the risk taken by the observers like security analysts, 
auditors and their firms in not understanding or correctly interpreting the risk the firm is taking, which may relate to 
the very survival of the financial firms doing the evaluating.  
 
Until more and better and more comparable information is available and mandated to be provided what else 
can be done? Because Derivatives are widely used by corporations, ostensibly solely to manage risk and because their 
usage can significantly affect financial results it is still necessary for analysts to evaluate or at least be aware of the 
extent to which a firm uses derivatives. 
 
First, it makes a difference whether options, forwards, futures, or swaps are utilized. Each has different 
consequences associated with their characteristics. For example options have a sunk, and therefore, recurring cost. 
Futures contracts do not have a sunk cost, but usage and price variation can result in frequent and costly margin calls. 
Forwards, unlike standardized exchange traded futures contracts have the potential for default and so on. 
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Secondly, the extent to which derivatives are used should be evaluated. We could establish three general 
categories. 
 
 Little or no significant usage and/or impact of derivatives usage. Tootsie Roll would be a good example of a 
very conservative company in the sample that only hedges raw material costs, sugar, and the hedging results 
generally have no material effect on financial results. In general then there would be minimal valuation and 
analysis problems associated with derivatives. 
 Moderate use of derivatives and/or impact of derivatives usage. For this and the next category we would 
evaluate whether the disclosure information was little and insufficient, moderate and typical, or detailed and 
helpful. The information needed and evaluated would include quantities and types of hedges, fair values, 
amount of the asset not hedged, gains, losses and positions held for 3 years, and a detailed discussion of 
hedging timing, philosophy, purpose and the results of current and past hedging results. 
 Extensive use or financial impact of derivatives usage. This category would have the same requirements as 
the previous category, moderate use, but the implications of not having substantial information would be 
more detrimental to an evaluation of the company's value and financial position.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is our belief that without the disclosure information suggested above anyone who invests in or lends to a 
company with a moderate or extensive exposure to derivatives has a significant risk exposure related to possible losses 
in derivatives position. As seen from the sample companies the amount of information provided varies widely and is 
often insufficient. An alternative way to evaluate the likely relative, or at least potential, risk in this case is to measure 
the historic (average?) size of the derivatives position as a percentage of the company's total assets and total liabilities. 
A second alternative is to evaluate the historic range of annual gains and losses as a percentage of the companies net 
worth and overall cash flow or cash flow from operations. In this way at least the size of a potential problem can be 
assessed. 
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